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I base this paper mainly on the experience I gained during fourteen yearsspent as Chief Executive of Oxford University Press. I imagine that I wasoffered this job because I had been for some years in effect a « non exe-
cutive director » of the business and held a University post in economics. So
two questions naturally pose themselves. Did knowing some economics help
me in the job? And did my experience in the job improve my understanding
of economics?
Although as an academic economist I was chiefly interested in and had writ-
ten about theory, I had come also to do a good deal of business consultancy.
This gradual widening in intellectual focus had moreover become associa-
ted, by 1972, by the feeling that I wanted no longer merely to be providing opi-
nions as to what business men should do, or, as a member of the Monopolies
Commission, on what they should be told not to do. I now wanted myself to
assume responsibility for taking decisions and living with their consequences.
The OUP job, although in an industry of which I had no previous experience,
responded therefore both to intellectual interest and emotional need.
When I joined OUP I sold all my economics library save a handful of books,
a neurotic, boat – burning exercise which I now regret. For many years I have
read virtually no economics, and this, I fear, will show. All I can say in self-
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defense is that my ideas, old or new, right or wrong, are the product of broo-
ding on my own direct experience.
The raison d’être of OUP is to provide a service to the world of learning and
scholarship through publishing and, in recent years, by giving financial help to
its University. At the same time it has to ensure long – run profit maximisation,
subject, not only to the normal legal and moral constraints, but also to being
prepared to publish any good monograph irrespective of its financial return.
When I first joined the Press, as OUP within the University is generally refer-
red to, earnings were very inadequate and the principal aim was survival.
In our textbook theory of the firm, we take as given what the firm makes,
together with the appropriate demand and production functions. The business
maximises profits by deciding how much of the « given » product to make and
with what input combination. Of course this little model is meant to be no
more than a brick in the larger theoretical edifice which we use to try to
explain, successfully or otherwise, how markets work. In order to focus on the
logic of certain decisions, it abstracts from everything else with which a chief
executive is concerned. It has no bearing, for example, on decisions regarding
the activities the firm should or should not be undertaking or the choice of an
appropriate internal organisation. But although decisions about pricing and
output levels are by no means the only or even the chief concern of manage-
ment, they are nevertheless important, and I shall now say something about
them before moving on to the matters which, when I was Chief Executive,
took up most of my time.
I suppose that we can describe publishing firms as being in monopolistic com-
petition. They are of course multi-products, the products being so-called
« titles », of which OUP, incidentally, may well have a uniquely large number. In
each title, the firm has normally, but not always, a monopoly based on copyright.
But although firms usually have monopolies in each of their titles, the indus-
try is exceedingly competitive. It is possible to enter it, for reasons which I
shall give shortly, with virtually no capital, and firms can usually switch,
without too much difficulty, from one kind of book publishing to another.
Titles may also compete closely with each other, not only in books out of copy-
right but also in, say, dictionaries or standard school or university texts. Where
no obvious differentiation exists between competing titles, publishers will try
hard to introduce some. Brand names therefore matter.
Dictionaries, for example, are very important to OUP, which had about half
the UK market, and the name « Oxford » attached to them provides some pro-
tection against competition from rivals by suggesting, I hope properly, a
degree of authority. When I was at OUP, Robert Maxwell came out with a
Pergamon Oxford Dictionary and I sought an injunction and damages on
ground of « passing off ». (That is to say for representing something to be what
it is not). I lost in the High Court but won at The Court of Appeal.
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The actual manufacturing cost of book, paper, printing, binding and so on, is
only a small part of what one hopes to sell it for – perhaps, 20 %. Calculated
per copy, it falls with the number printed, because of the constant setting costs,
but modern technology has made this curve flatter than it used to be. This
manufacturing cost, together with a royalty paid on sales, are the only out-
goings reliably attributable to individual titles. The bulk of the overhead so
very hard to allocate, being to do with editing, warehouse storage and hand-
ling, distributing, marketing and selling, the cost of the computer people, the
accountants and so on. You know that a slow selling monograph, which may
have to be picked from store individually, costs more to distribute, say, than a
fast moving school textbook. You may also know, however, that the monogra-
ph came in as camera ready copy, whereas the school textbook took up many
hours of market research and editorial development. So you try to get some
clearer idea of attributable cost by assessing these factors, although the point
soon comes, in many cases, when the marginal cost of trying to do so effecti-
vely – getting editors to fill in time sheets and so on – looks like outweighing
any resultant benefit.
Broadly speaking, therefore, except where large investments are concerned,
you try to make sure that the receipts to be obtained from the sale of the book
are at least enough to meet the low attributable costs plus an amount, which
may vary between categories, sufficient to make an adequate contribution to
overheads. Only in some cases, however, does this mean thinking in terms of
a single price – output combination, of one point, that is on an estimated
demand curve. Generally, you make the most of the monopoly you have in the
title by price discrimination and other devices.
You may, for example, first bring out a hardback to cream the market and
then have a paperback a year later. The difference in price between these two
editions has little to do with differences in cost, which are not great. One may
also try to charge different prices in different markets, although limits to this
are set by the possibility of so called « buying round », by the ability, say, of a
Harvard professor to buy directly from Blackwell’s bookshop in Oxford. It
may be more profitable to sell sheets for binding up in foreign markets or to
sell rights – that is to permit a foreign publisher himself to bring out the book
in his own market on payment of a lump sum, or, more usually a royalty, with
precise specification as to where his edition can be sold. And of course you can
sell translation rights for foreign language editions.
Deals of this kind are sometimes reached after the books have been publi-
shed, but where, say, expensive art books or childrens’ picture books are
concerned, they may have to be fixed up in advance before the investment risk
is taken. It would be tedious to mention all the ways in which profits can be
squeezed from a title, but they are many. In my day, for example, we arranged
to have one of our older popular dictionaries to be sold cheap by Marks and
Spencers under the title « The St Michael’s Dictionary », estimating that it
would not compete much with our other bookshop dictionary sales. The poss-
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sibility of these various kinds of price discrimination is important in publi-
shing, and without them many titles would never see the light of day.
My time as Chief Executive was not much spent on individual publishing
decisions which, given that there were thousands of titles, had to be taken
lower down. If the investment was large, I did however become involved and
we did go through the kind of appraisal that the book on business studies
recommends. But it often came down to judgement rather than calculation.
The decision to put the great multi-volume Oxford English Dictionary on
CD Rom disk was of this kind. The costs were very high and their recovery
were not possible from the sales expected. Yet the case for going ahead see-
med to me very strong. The best hope of keeping the dictionary up to date at
an affordable cost was to have it in machine readable form. Although compu-
terisation enabled us to publish a new hard copy edition, it seemed to me that
this would be the last such, as the electronic edition offered enormously super-
ior forms of access. Given that we were in business to serve scholarship, this
consideration had to be given great weight. I was also sure that, although the
printed book had still a long life ahead of it, reference works, of which we
published many, as well as large textbooks, would probably, sooner or later, be
sold in electronic form. If we did not gain experience in this field, a large part
of our business would therefore slip away from us. So we took the plunge. In
matters of this kind, timing is of the essence ; one should not leave it too late,
but if one comes in long before the market is ready, a good deal of money can
be squandered.
The kind of investment decisions that get taken at Chief Executive level tend
to be those where formal decision theory does not take one very far. The
important bit is deciding what one should be thinking about, not the process of
formal reasoning. Of course you collect relevant information, and you discuss
it a great deal, but, whether it be a consortium deciding whether to build a
Channel Tunnel, or little OUP deciding whether to enter electronic publishing,
judgement, guesswork, and animal spirits play a major part.
So much for pricing and investment decisions ; let me now turn to the mat-
ters which took up most of my time and from which our theory of the firm abs-
tracts. They relate, on the one hand, to the external relations of the firm, and,
on the other, to its internal organisation.
When I talk of the firm’s external relations I wish to refer to its position in
the complex pattern of transactions, association and affiliation which I descri-
bed in an article I published in 1972, just before I gave up economics. I said
there that market economies worked not merely through pure market transac-
tions, but by virtue of cooperation, taking place within a network of inter-firm
relationships which, at that time, although perhaps not now, economists tended
to neglect. This neglect was connected, I think, with the habit of treating firms
as making products, rather than undertaking activities which could be combi-
ned within firms or distributed among them in many different ways.
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All this proved highly relevant to publishing. I may have given the impression
that book publishers all do the same thing, differences in titles apart. This is
very far from the case. When I joined OUP, for example, we had our own prin-
ting business and our own paper mill. I am told that we had earlier made our
own ink. I sold off the paper mill and reduced the printing from a work force of
over a thousand to just two hundred. It has now all but been eliminated.
Let me explain why we did these things. When I joined, OUP’s publishing
side bought only 8 % of the paper produced by our mill at Wolvercote. The
mill had a single large machine which could switched from producing one kind
of paper to another only at the cost of a good deal of down-time. As our publi-
shing required a variety of papers, it did not therefore make sense to produce
them all ourselves. Our printing business was therefore allowed to buy paper
where it liked – subject to some arm twisting when our mill was very short of
work – it being encouraged to sell the bulk of its output where it could.
All this worked very badly and helped to give me premature grey hair. I
knew that the mill would be much safer as part of a larger paper making group,
with an extensive marketing organisation and owned by people who knew
something about the trade, and I knew that the Press would be better without
it. To use the terminology of my 1972 article, the activity of paper making is
complementary to the activity of book production and has to be coordinated
with it, but it does not make sense, nowadays at any rate, to do this by conso-
lidation in one enterprise. This is so for two reasons. First, the activities,
though complementary, are not similar in the special sense that the capabili-
ties (that is the knowledge, experience and skills) of the organisations under-
taking are different. Secondly, the economies of scale associated with making
particular types of paper are large enough to make it uneconomic for a publi-
shing business, which needs a variety of papers, to manufacture them itself.
It was more difficult to give up printing. The work was in the same building
as our publishing staff, and, of course, as the name indicates, the « Press » had
started with printing, so that its abandonment represented a great break with
tradition. But, as in the case of the paper mill, the demands from the publishing
side were for a variety of printing greater than one plant could economically
supply. Very small monograph runs, very large dictionary runs, colour work,
examination papers… all these called naturally for specialised facilities all of
which our own business could not expect to have.
The case for running down our printing business was therefore strong, quite
apart from the existence of certain internal weaknesses and the easy availabili-
ty of cheap setting in India and printing in Hong Kong. I have to admit, howe-
ver, that whereas I had decided at an earlier stage that the paper mill had to go,
I did try to make the printing profitable, perhaps mistakenly, and I failed.
OUP was, I suppose, the most vertically integrated book publishing business
in Britain, as well as one of the largest. At the other end of the spectrum could
be found people who published from their living rooms, putting out all func-
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tions save commissioning. They scarcely needed capital, if those responsible
for the distribution were content with a percentage of sales value and the prin-
ter was prepared to wait for payment until books had been sold. All the so-
called publisher had to do was to get authors to write saleable books for him.
As well as being multi-products, therefore, in the sense that they have a list
of more than one title, publishing firms are also multi-activities, there being
great variation in the range of activities they can choose to undertake. I could
refer here to degree of vertical integration, but activities cannot all be ranked in
the kind of order that it implies. Commissioning, copy editing, design, so cal-
led production (the preparation of books for printing and dealing with printers),
warehousing, order servicing and distribution, marketing, sales, the provision
of information services, these are some of the activities which publishing busi-
nesses may either undertake themselves or pay others to undertake. And there
can be further sub-divisions ; a firm will typically undertake its own marketing
in some countries, for example, while deciding, in others, to rely on agents.
Given then that publishing businesses can be so various, in terms of the acti-
vities they undertake, it does not make sense to talk about an optimum size for
them. And there is no reason to believe that because particular activities come
to show increasing returns to scale, firms will therefore necessarily become
larger. I remember as an undergraduate being made to worry on this score ; the
fact that manufacturing firms had falling unit cost curves raised the spectre of
one firm coming in time to take over each industry, an ineluctible process
bound ultimately, according to Professor Sraffa, to spell doom for the compe-
titive market economy. Refuge was sought in administrative diseconomies of
scale, or in the aging process that brought down the trees in Marshall’s forest,
but there was no real conviction that these factors could save the situation.
As so often of course, the problem was created by our conceptual apparatus,
which did not make sufficient allowance for the fact that the development of
scale economies, which are associated with activities, leads to changes in
industrial structure. At no time would printers, for example, think of getting
bigger just to exploit the scale economies inherent in making ink ; they natu-
rally chose to stop making it and buy in. Marshall saw the importance of indus-
trial morphology and so of course did Adam Smith, but somehow by the time I
was being taught economics of the profession had sometimes become blinded
by its own schematisations. I should have been made to read Smith rather than
Sraffa ; when Smith said that the division of labour was limited by the scale of
the market, he was thinking in terms of a continuous process accompanied by
a constant separating out and re-grouping of the activities that firms undertake.
Paradoxically, the exploitation of scale economies may be greater when
there are small firms, each concentrating on a few activities only, than when
there are large firms, each undertaking a great many. OUP, for a variety of rea-
sons, had in fact become a large firm of this kind. I have explained the inheri-
tance of printing and of a paper mill. Furthermore, the natural desire of the
Delegates that the University’s Press should be prepared to publish any good
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scholarly work irrespective of its discipline, together with the loose rein main-
tained on editorial initiative, led OUP to publish in almost every field save
modern fiction, so that, although a large publisher overall, it was and is small
relative to more specialised competitors in many particular categories.
The issue constantly arose, indeed, as to whether to do something ourselves,
or get others, apparently better placed, to do it for us. Take, for example, a
large medical textbook published by us in the UK, for which there was a poten-
tial U.S. sale. One option was to have the book marketed by our own American
business in New York. Another was to identify a large American medical
publisher specialising in works of this kind, who would market it on our
behalf. If we went the former way, it was alleged by the Oxford editors that
our US marketing staff failed to have as much specialised experience, with
example, as good specialised mailing lists as had the large American medical
publisher. If we went the latter way, we seemed ostensibly to lack faith in our
own US business and would certainly be depriving it of turnover. And so on. I
therefore spent much time uncomfortably on the horns of this dilemma, pushed
and pulled in different directions by people, who, seeing things from only their
own angle, were sure what to do.
Publishers, in all manners of ways, live by taking in each others’ washing.
They take in books from publishers in other countries in order to sell them in
their own ; they acquire licenses to publish other firms’ books in agreed terri-
tories or in particular forms – say in paperback rather than hardback ; even
within the country in which they are established they may pay a specialised
firm to warehouse and distribute their books or get another publishing business
to do it for them. Of course it is the smaller firms that rely most on obtaining
services from others, but large firms may do so also.
At one time, for example, we considered in OUP whether Collins might take
over the warehousing of our books ; our Neasden warehouse was old and inef-
ficient, the Glasgow warehouse of Collins was too big for their own needs. The
possibility was very seriously considered, even although we were probably the
two largest publishers in Britain and, in some areas, such as dictionaries, in
« head on » competition. I shall not give the reasons, which you can probably
guess, why the deal was not made ; my point is this context is that firms may
at the same time both cooperate and compete with each other. Blackwell’s for
example, competed with OUP in publishing, traded with it as a retailer and
cooperated with it through joint ownership of bookshops.
One constantly hears of the need for managers to be competitive, even
aggressively so, but much less about the need for them to be able to coopera-
te effectively, chiefly of course within their own firm, but also in its relations
with others. But successful business, as it is almost too obvious to note,
depends on having people that can be trusted and who can be identified with
the interests of a group and not just their own. I read, some time ago, how
Robert Frank had shown that students of economics were more likely than
were students in other areas to be defectors rather than cooperators in games
38 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°129-130, 1er et 2ème trimestres 2010
based on the Prisoner’ Dilemma; whether they had this inclination through the
effect of economics, or had taken up the subject because of it, was not stated.
It might in any case do no harm if we said more about how cooperative as well
as competitive dispositions help make the economic world go round.
I have probably said enough about the external relationship of firms. Their
variety and importance had come to my attention before I knew anything about
publishing, and prompted me to write the 1972 article. My experience in OUP
confirmed my belief in what I said then. I became Chief Executive, however,
knowing nothing about the internal organisation of firms and my experience led
me to see that the reference I made to that subject in the article was misleading.
I was sometimes careless enough, when first teaching our subject, to say that
firms were islands of central planning, within a sea of arm’s-length market
transactions. I later learned, for all the reasons that I have just given, that I was
wrong about the sea. I learned only later that I was wrong about the islands. In
the 1972 article, I said that complementary activities could be coordinated by
pure market transactions, or by cooperation or, after consolidation in one
enterprise, by central direction. While accepting that it was impossible some-
how to centralise information so as to run an economy by central planning, I
unthinkingly held to the view that such centralisation was fully possible within
a firm, so that direction was, in that context, the way in which coordination
would always be achieved. I failed to appreciate what a difference it made on
the island when Robinson Crusoe was joined by Man Friday. I failed to appre-
ciate that, when more than one person becomes involved, efficient resource
allocation is no longer just a question of the logic of choice but a question of
social organisation. I unconsciously clung to our so-called theory of the firm,
which postulates a single decision taker.
The staff of OUP, when I joined it, was some 3000 strong. (It is now more
numerous). They were of course all, in a sense, under central authority ; they
were under the authority of the Chief Executive who in turn was under the
authority of the Delegates representing the University. The job of the Chief
Executive was so to try to establish their delegated authorities, their goals, the
rules they had to follow and their relationships with each other, and so to
influence attitudes and atmosphere that the interaction of their activities would
result in an efficient use of resources and the maximisation of profits.
A firm is a bundle of activities that have to be coordinated. Central direction
is one way of doing this ; when OUP decided to build a new distribution centre
at Corby, a careful plan had to be made prescribing who would do what, when,
and much the same will be necessary in constructing a power station or a ship.
Moreover, some decisions were so important for OUP as a whole, that they had
to be taken at the centre ; whether to give up printing, whether to computerise
the OED, whether to change the management in New York, these were deci-
sions of this kind. Scrutiny of new book proposals was undertaken at fairly
high levels, and, in the case of UK academic books, by the Delegates sitting in
Oxford’s seventeeth century Clarendon Building.
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We had also a system of budgetting to try to ensure that the number of new
titles we planned to publish, which in my time amounted to about a thousand
a year, together with back list sales, would generate sales sufficient to cover all
our costs and provide a profit. But, despite central control of this kind, we were
dependent essentially on a large number of often risky investment decisions
taken by a fairly large number of people to whom the responsibility had been
delegated, people who were expected to be enterprising and creative and not
just to do what they were told.
I have not the time now to present, nor you the patience to read or listen to, an
adequate account of how organisation and rules have to be developed in the
endeavour to ensure that all this decentralised decision-taking promotes the maxi-
misation of group profits. But I should like to make, and then develop, one point.
What I learned at OUP, and had not before fully appreciated, was the extent
to which the internal organisation of a firm is a microeconomic system similar
to the macroeconomic system within which the firm operates. The coordina-
tion of activities within a firm is achieved, in other words, in some ways simi-
lar to those in which coordination of activities is achieved among firms. The
task of a top management is indeed to set up within a firm an economic sys-
tem in which not only some central direction, but also both market transac-
tions, of a kind, and cooperation, of a kind, can be effective. I am referring, of
course, to my experience in one industry, publishing, in which the scope for
central direction is less than in many, perhaps most, others. In the chemical
industry, or the heavy electrical industry, it is certainly greater, but, in general,
de-centralised decision – taking always has some role to play.
The microeconomic system, if I may so call the firm’s internal organisation,
is similar to the macroeconomic system, if I may so call the system within
which it operates, but is of course not the same. Microeconomic systems are
the product of conscious design, albeit influenced also by evolution, whereas
macroeconomic systems are not.
The design of an economic microsystem involves introducing a system of
internal prices. In our standard theory of the firm, the single decision taker is
faced with only market prices for inputs and outputs. But within real life firms,
there are decision takers not faced by these real prices but who have to be led
to take decisions which promote profit maximisation. The goods and services
supplied within the firm have therefore somehow to be priced so that decision
takers, in choosing which of them to use, and how much, will be aware of the
cost incurred. Internal transactions, in other words, have to be carried out in
accord with signals that reflect cost. Some titles, as I mentioned earlier, cost
more to distribute than do others and editors must work under instructions that
cause them to take account of this fact. Where prices do not exist, they have to
be invented, or instructions must be given which have the same effect, an
example being the rule that, on the sales of a title, editors must normally seek
a specified gross profit margin judged sufficient to recover the relevant ove-
rhead expenses.
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It is striking how closely, at least in OUP, our microsystem design came to
model what the classical economists would have called the natural order.
OUP’s many branches and jointly – owned companies throughout the world
operated as distinct profit centres, in accordance with rules which, it was
hoped, would cause group profits to be maximised if each of the centres sought
to maximise its own. These centres were the microsystem’s equivalent to
firms, and they were linked by the approximate equivalent of the market tran-
sactions which coordinate activities in the macrosystem.
In certain circumstances, the equivalence was very close. As I mentioned ear-
lier, the Oxford publishing divisions were free to give work to, or withhold work
from, our own printing division, which was itself free to accept or refuse it. In
other circumstances the equivalence was imperfect. The publishing divisions in
Oxford, for example, sold books to our businesses in New York or Melbourne
for onward resale – and vice versa. But such inter-branch trading was subject to
constraints. The parties were obliged to buy and sell from each other, as they
would not have been in transactions with outside parties. OUP Australia could
not have said, for example, that they wished to switch from selling Oxford dic-
tionaries to those produced by Collins. The prices at which trading took place
were not established, as in the printing case, in a competitive market, but either
settled by bilateral bargaining or determined by rules set by group management.
In any case, intra-firm trading, albeit more restricted than inter-firm trading, was
one of the ways in which activities were coordinated within OUP.
Cooperation represented another way, the job of the Chief Executive in this
context being to construct an organisation that will promote the patterns of
cooperation required. Perhaps I can explain this best by giving an account, not
of how OUP got it right, but of how OUP got it wrong. Before I became Chief
Executive, but while I was a Delegate, there was great concern about the very
inadequate level of profits being earned by OUP, and an outside member of its
Finance Committee managed to persuade the Vice Chancellor and Delegates
to bring in consultants to recommend changes.
The new structure which they proposed, and which the management accep-
ted, was, for the UK operation, something like this. There were to be three so-
called Publishing Divisions, which were to be provided with services by a UK
Publishing Services Division, such services including warehousing, order ser-
vicing, marketing, sales, design and so-called production, which meant arran-
ging for books to be printed.
I became Chief Executive before this new structure was in place but after it
had been decided upon. My job therefore was to sell it to the troops and I recall
haranguing staff in London and Oxford as to its advantages. They were of
course the advantages of scale and specialisation. Instead of each publishing
division looking after their own marketing, production and design, these func-
tions would be undertaken by specialists within the services division. The new
large production department, for example, would be able to get better terms
from printers by having more work to put out. Hitherto one small production
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or design department could be over-stretched while another had excess capa-
city, but by the total demands on a combined production department would be
more stable. Within the large production department, there could be further
specialisation, some people concentrating on paperbacks, someone on jacket
design and so on. These were the kinds of advantages I promised.
What had been recommended by the consultants, and accepted by OUP
management, was duly put into effect. And it worked very badly. Why was this
so? Essentially because, in some cases, effective coordination between editing
books, their design, production and marketing requires continuous, trusting
cooperation between those undertaking these activities, and the possibility of
arbitration between them in the case of disagreement. In the organisation we
had set up, an editor within a Publishing Division could have his book desi-
gned or marketed by someone in the Services Division, whom he did not natu-
rally see as a colleague and who was working in a quite different part of the
building ; more importantly, were the editor to be dissatisfied with the design
or the marketing, he could appeal only by taking the matter to his own super-
ior, who could take it up with a more senior person in the Services Division. If
disagreement then still persisted, the issue could be decided only by taking it
right up to the Chief Executive, to whom the heads of the Publishing and
Services Divisions reported.
As the business could not be run effectively in this manner, much of the new
organisation came to be scrapped. Each Publishing Division, and indeed some-
times particular groupings within them – science and medicine, school books,
journals and so on – got their own production and design people and to some
extent their own marketing people. Whatever scale economies existed in the
old structure were sacrificed in order to get the ease of communication, the
option of rapid arbitration and the sense of common loyalty that comes with a
smaller group. Each Publishing Division, however, could not be given its own
warehousing ; here scale economies were great enough to dominate other
considerations, so that this service remained centralised.
In determining a satisfactory arrangement of activities within a firm or a
satisfactory distribution activities between firms, the same considerations have
to be borne in mind. I discussed earlier the circumstances that influence the
decision whether or not a firm undertakes an activity in-house. If the activity
is undertaken, the same circumstances influence the decision whether, and to
what extent, it should be decentralised within the firm. On the one hand, there
are the economies of scale and specialisation, on the other the advantage for
effective cooperation of short lines of communication, of the development of
team loyalty and of rapid arbitration where needed.
The balance is not always easy to strike and changing circumstances may call
for its readjustment. During my time at the Press, for example, printing seemed
best bought in, distribution done in-house, but centralised in each country, mar-
keting, production and design done in-house but decentralised in each branch
down to the level of broad publishing categories – monographs, English
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Language Teaching books, school books, music and so on. In previous periods
the balance may well have been different and it may indeed be different today.
One tends to be conscious, moreover, of the disadvantages of the status quo. I
was frequently pressed, for example, to appoint a group marketing director, but
although this might have offered some advantages, I thought it would deprive
us of others associated with our decentralised marketing responsibility. Some
argued that we could somehow get the best of both worlds, and have both a
group marketing director and maintain the decentralisation of the function, but
I judged, rightly or wrongly, that this would make it too difficult to know, what
it seemed to me important to know, namely, who was in charge.
Business is sometimes like war, of which Clausewitz said it was often easy
to see what to do, but very hard to do it. And what I am presenting to you as a
mere problem of organisational theory, presented itself to me also as a power
struggle between men eager to defend or extent their territories. Understanding
the principles is a necessary, and sometimes difficult beginning, but, for a
Chief Executive, the hard work is in their application.
In conclusion, therefore, what can an economist learn from managing a busi-
ness? And, more particularly, how relevant to his subject is what he learns?
You may have thought, as you listened to me, that I came to talk less and less
about economics and more about the organisational questions we should leave
to business schools. But should we, as economists, so to limit our subject as to
leave these questions out of account ?
I have no doubt that the pure logic of choice, the principles of rational alloca-
tion, decision theory, if you will, can be directly useful in business, but, in rela-
tion to the issues discussed in the latter part of my paper, it hardly helps at all.
It seems to me that the neo-classical economists took a false turning when they
thought that they could somehow develop the pure logic of choice to provide a
model of economic organisation. The need for organisation arises because each
individual sees only a small part of the picture, and that darkly, and because of
the problems of coordination created by the division of labour ; it arises, that is,
because of the existence of circumstances with which Smith and Marshall were
very familiar but which Walras assumed away. Perhaps that is why Keynes, in a
letter written in 1934 to Hicks (of all people !) expressed the view that «Walras’s
theory and all others along those lines are little better than nonsense ».
This much I know; models of the economic system based on assumptions
about perfect knowledge, whatever that means (if anything) make no sense. It
is precisely because knowledge is fragmented and imperfect that we require
economic systems to further the efficient use of resources, and there can the-
refore be no merit in model systems that postulate the absence of these very
conditions. My experience in business led me to understand how firms, as well
as being part of economic systems, are economic systems in themselves, both
kinds of system being proper objects for our study.
